The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran

Paperback, 304 pages

English language

Published Sept. 6, 2005 by Harvard University Press.

ISBN:: 978-0-674-01843-3

(1 review)

The shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, would remain on the throne for the foreseeable future: This was the firm conclusion of a top-secret CIA analysis issued in October 1978. One hundred days later the shah--despite his massive military, fearsome security police, and superpower support was overthrown by a popular and largely peaceful revolution. But the CIA was not alone in its myopia, as Charles Kurzman reveals in this penetrating work; Iranians themselves, except for a tiny minority, considered a revolution inconceivable until it actually occurred. Revisiting the circumstances surrounding the fall of the shah, Kurzman offers rare insight into the nature and evolution of the Iranian revolution and into the ultimate unpredictability of protest movements in general.

As one Iranian recalls, "The future was up in the air." Through interviews and eyewitness accounts, declassified security documents and underground pamphlets, Kurzman documents the overwhelming sense of confusion that gripped pre-revolutionary …

The shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, would remain on the throne for the foreseeable future: This was the firm conclusion of a top-secret CIA analysis issued in October 1978. One hundred days later the shah--despite his massive military, fearsome security police, and superpower support was overthrown by a popular and largely peaceful revolution. But the CIA was not alone in its myopia, as Charles Kurzman reveals in this penetrating work; Iranians themselves, except for a tiny minority, considered a revolution inconceivable until it actually occurred. Revisiting the circumstances surrounding the fall of the shah, Kurzman offers rare insight into the nature and evolution of the Iranian revolution and into the ultimate unpredictability of protest movements in general.

As one Iranian recalls, "The future was up in the air." Through interviews and eyewitness accounts, declassified security documents and underground pamphlets, Kurzman documents the overwhelming sense of confusion that gripped pre-revolutionary Iran, and that characterizes major protest movements. His book provides a striking picture of the chaotic conditions under which Iranians acted, participating in protest only when they expected others to do so too, the process approaching critical mass in unforeseen and unforeseeable ways. Only when large numbers of Iranians began to "think the unthinkable," in the words of the U.S. ambassador, did revolutionary expectations become a self-fulfilling prophecy. A corrective to 20-20 hindsight, this book reveals shortcomings of analyses that make the Iranian revolution or any major protest movement seem inevitable in retrospect.

2 editions

iceberg reviewed The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran by Charles Kurzman

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2 stars

I broadly agree with Kurzman's implicit assertion in the introduction that society is a complex system in the technical sense, which may render precise prediction impossible, and that this has been insufficiently incorporated into social science ontology and methodology; however, the way that this is argued in the chapters is weak, even devolving into attacking straw men.

For example, in the chapter arguing against the predictive value of economic indicators like poverty, relative deprivation/income inequality, or inflation, Kurzman compares Iran with similar oil-exporting countries that did not have revolutions in the 1970s or '80s -- but that did have uprisings and rebellions. What is the point of this rebuttal if no one is arguing that a struggling economy is sufficient cause for a successful revolution? Likewise, Kurzman points out that it was not those living in shanty towns, but rather the bazaaris that took up protest early and enthusiastically. But …

I broadly agree with Kurzman's implicit assertion in the introduction that society is a complex system in the technical sense, which may render precise prediction impossible, and that this has been insufficiently incorporated into social science ontology and methodology; however, the way that this is argued in the chapters is weak, even devolving into attacking straw men.

For example, in the chapter arguing against the predictive value of economic indicators like poverty, relative deprivation/income inequality, or inflation, Kurzman compares Iran with similar oil-exporting countries that did not have revolutions in the 1970s or '80s -- but that did have uprisings and rebellions. What is the point of this rebuttal if no one is arguing that a struggling economy is sufficient cause for a successful revolution? Likewise, Kurzman points out that it was not those living in shanty towns, but rather the bazaaris that took up protest early and enthusiastically. But was anyone expecting the poorest members of society to be a revolutionary vanguard against an autocratic monarch?

However, I have found idea of emergent preferences (although I don't believe Kurzman uses the word "emergent") to be influential on my own understanding of revolutions, so this is more of a 2.5-star book for me. Maybe I just want something that seriously connects complexity science and sociology, and this isn't it.

Subjects

Revolutions & coups
Middle East
History
Iran
Revolutionary
History / Middle East