Taliban

This book--published in 2000--is about the then-ascendant Taliban. Their rise seemed pretty implausible. The movement was started by Muhammad Omar, a man of little-to-no standing, who had fought with the Mujahideen and later set up his own madrassa (Islamic school). An unlikely leader--shy, uninspiring, parochial, of powerful convictions but limited intelligence or education--Omar nevertheless tapped into the widespread outrage against the warlords who ruled Afghanistan: openly corrupt, ruling purely in their own self-interest, they did not even feign observation of the public good, nor to Islam.

The Taliban got their start by kicking the warlords out of town and administering their form of Deobandi-inspired Islamic justice. Once things were under their control, they were able to cash in on the profits being made by trucking cartels and opium smugglers. They cultivated networks of madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan, from which they could replenish their ranks with devoted students.

In a way, the Taliban were modernisers. The warlords they replaced legitimated their rule through tribal connections and the upholding of "Pashtunwali", the Pashtun way of doing things. The Taliban were different. Although their popular support was largely confined to Pashtuns, the movement undoubtedly put Islam first. Its soldiers and commanders knew little to nothing about the history of their own country or people; most could not remember a time before war.

On the one hand checking the tribal Pashtun squabbles, the Taliban failed on the other to make inroads to other ethnic groups. They also refused to actually govern the country, proclaiming themselves to be a purely religious movement. Their ideal of governance was to simply purge the ruling class of those who were, in their eyes, disobedient of Islam. God would take care of the rest.

I get a real sense that the Taliban were (at least in those days) fairly amateurish. They knew little beyond small villages and the self-contained world of the madrassa. They had no grasp of international politics. They burnt unnecessary bridges in spurning or ignoring (because their leaders were too busy fighting) sympathetic messages and offers from foreign organisations and countries. When they finally rolled into Kabul, their rule was more like a military occupation than a change of regime.

One thing Rashid never really makes clear is how the Taliban, who sought to purify society, justified (at least to themselves) the fact that they funded themselves by skimming profits off of the opium trade. On numerous occasions, the deeds of the Taliban seemed at odds with their words. For a movement sustained on outrage against the corrupt elites, how did they keep the moral high-ground? Was it just a case of them capturing the madrassas, thus ensuring a pipeline of devoted followers childhood-to-madrassa-to-battlefield? I'm thinking here of something like how Shaka Zulu monopolised reproduction and upbringing, training boys from birth to be obedient, fierce warriors in pursuit of the cause.

This is not a bad book, although it has dated poorly, almost beyond the point of relevance or enjoyment. Rashid is obviously well-researched. He will often explain X person or Y event by appealing to the fact that he was there when it happened. He has a deep grounding in the happenings of 90s Afghanistan. Still, the writing is a bit too factual, a bit too "who-did-what-when" to communicate lasting insight. A lot has happened since 2000; a lot has happened since 2021, when the Taliban came back to power. As detailed as this book is, it's probably too limited to be worth your while.