Why this ever was bestseller is beyond me. David, cribbing more or less wholesale from his sources, never manages to go beyond rehashes of conventional takes on military events – outdated ones at that, judging from the cases where I am more familiar with current academic discourse (Teutoburger Wald, Crécy, Caporetto). The promised analysis of causes and patterns never materialises, a handful of throwaway sentences after rambling retellings a poor excuse for them. A few infuriatingly superficial remarks hint at more, but never lead anywhere (as an example, David mentions in his chapter on Bannockburn that Edward I. successfully repressed the Scots with combined arms, something his son did not even try. Exploring how this came about – effectively, why medieval armies lacked institutional learning – could be a fascinating topic, even if done superficially, but David fails to follow up). Add some truly ghastly “Old White Dude” missteps and a tendency to riff on the Great Man theory of history with a Great Incompetent theory of command and you have a truly frustrating, pointless read.