The enumeration of the kinds of legal person were interesting. However, this chapter also digresses into a digestible treatment of legal fictions that I found really valuable. The difference between historic fictions—expanding the law by pretending that a new scenario meets the procedural requirements of tradition—and dogmatic fictions—compacting the law into the established rule—makes a lot of sense. And it clarifies the primary weakness of each. Historical fictions intended to be just, not intended to make perfect sense on their own terms. Thus, as they age, they can obscure what we're doing as much as they can help overcome resistance to change. Dogmatic fictions can simplify dramatically (such as when constructive notice relieves people of the affirmative but redundant duty to make people aware of material facts), but they are also entirely unsuited to creating new law because they are not strictly about doing the right thing.

But never let it be said that officers of the law are unwilling to make shit up to get their way. If they're doing it to expand access or because it does not make sense to turn someone away, fair enough. If they're doing it to materially change rules, perhaps that requires even more suspicion than we ordinarily give them.