Really broad, elegant stuff in the statute chapter that kicks off the direct discussion of SOURCES of law. Judges frequently mistake the metaphor of legislative intent for the reality of what they are doing, which is almost always legislating to fill the gaps where legislators DID NOT have any particular intention. It's Erie guesses all the way down.

There is an incredible footnote where Grey just points out that "legal interpretation" is not even interpretation at all. It's not about what the statute says. Interpreting a statute based on context from other laws or judicial decisions means reasoning from other sources of law, not interpretation. Really neat point.

"When amendment is difficult, interpretation is free." This is why the constitution, which is impossible to amend in modernity, means anything and everything. This is why, when major civil rights legislation happens (which is hardly a MATERIAL victory, but we're working with liberal hats on rn), courts immediately set about interpreting the meaning out of them. The Civil Rights Act of 1965 or the Fourteenth Amendment will never be repealed; therefore, the judicial project becomes interpretation in ways that preserve the preceding legal order to the extent possible.

Also a great passage where Grey, in 1909, explains the doctrines attendant to the legal fiction of corporate citizenship as self-contradictory nonsense. Relatable.

I was procrastinating by reading some Karl Llewellyn earlier, and he reminded me of some updates to these ideas that I find useful. The observation that the one who interprets statutes is the lawmaker extends beyond judges, obviously. For instance, the police officer who decides that punching you in the face is legal, or the bureaucrat who decides that you do not deserve benefits. Another good update was that, if what Grey is saying about the distinction between law and sources of law (and, for that matter, interpretation) is true, then the actual content and words of the statues are not necessarily significant to the study of jurisprudence at all. What matters is what people who decide actually command and what others actually do in response to those commands, not the words within sources of law.