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Alicia Juarrero: Context Changes Everything (2023, MIT Press, The MIT Press)

#JuarreroBook Ch. 3 starts out by again highlighting the importance of “context” – which can by temporal, spatial or hybrid (includes aspects of both).

Spatial context is understood extremely broadly and includes “psychosociocultural situations such as economic conditions and social activities, as well as those physical, material, chemical, and biological conditions in which events and processes take place”

Context exerts influence through constraints. Constraints come in two variants: context-independent and context-dependent.

“By precipitating symmetry breaks and making entities and processes covary conditional on each other, constraints turn possibility spaces irregular.”

“Because numerous constraints must be continuously satisfied on many dimensions and time scales simultaneously, possibility spaces also reconfigure moment by moment in response to those multiple constraints, entrenched as well as current new ones. Possibility spaces are thus defined by their probability contour (Buchler 1977) or dynamic signature (Kelso 1995). I call it its profile.”

These possibility spaces are not …

@uh Ulrike and Dimitri, I have been busy elsewhere. Returning to your excellent summaries and replies I have to make some comments on where I come from. I will reread the chapters and come up with comments later, if I think I have to say something valuable. I am a (psycho)pharmacologist from education and a (partial?) neuroscientist because I studied more than pharmacology. I am certainly not a philosopher like you. Your comments help me to understand that angle of reading the book. What is appealing to me is that Juarrero (and some other writers I studied, like Collier, Jaeger, Metzinger) leave the 'old school' approach of how the brain works behind. I think the approach of the brain doing calculations, using algorithms, certain nuclei or parts doing specific tasks etc is at least one-sided and maybe wrong. I am pretty sure that the reductionist view that what the brain does can in the end be explained bottom-up, ie the total of neuronal (and other cells) activity, is wrong. That is why the idea of top-down causation eg (and emergence and more) is appealing to me. Your discussions and previous ones on Mastodon help to keep (or get) me grounded. I think my intuition that Juarrero is on to something is healthy, but I search for information that helps me evaluate to what extend my intuitions are correct (it is stupid to deny intuitions, but they are dangerous to trust). So thanks so far and I will be back.

@MolemanPeter @uh I’m not a philosopher either, Peter but rather a cognitive psychologist or cognitive scientist. From that perspective, I think I’d argue that the more standard view on the computational view of mind is non-reductionist. In fact, I was thinking this last week that Marr’s view that the explanation of a computational system as requiring computational level, algorithmic level and implementation level explanation fits really well with Juarrero’s notion of constraint