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commented on Context Changes Everything by Alicia Juarrero

Alicia Juarrero: Context Changes Everything (2023, MIT Press, The MIT Press) 1 star

#JuarreroBook Chapter 6 Part 1 There's a lot in this chapter, and some of it I find hard to understand. So I'd like to split things up. We are now on context dependent constraints, the nature of which is to "take conditions away from independence"

The ch. outlines "three examples of the emergence of long-range correlations generated in virtue of context-dependent constraints. The first serves as a metaphor of phase transitions. The second illustrates inter-dependent dynamics among oscillators. The third is the textbook case of self- organizing, nonlinear, and far from equilibrium processes in the natural world. All three show how context-dependent constraints, operating against a backdrop established by context-independent constraints, weave global forms of order".

The examples are: 1. the phase transition of a random graph with sufficiently many links that it moves to connectedness

  1. synchronising pendulum clocks on a shelf

  2. convection patterns such as Bernard cells

What do …

@uh @UlrikeHahn@fediscience.org @dcm@social.sunet.se

Indeed this is a much longer chapter! I stopped at p. 73 for now.

I share your concern about the ontology here: Juarrero talks constantly about constraints 'doing' things, and even being a form of causality (though she doesn't say how). But her examples suggest that what she calls constraints are just ways of describing patterns that appear when certain entities interact with each other in specific organised ways. This impression is reinforced by the apparently circular treatment of context-dependent constraints on p.70: they are characterised by appeal to constrained interactions...

But then, rather than being something ontologically additional that does things, constraints are just ways of talking about features of such patterns, which are in their turn constituted by the familiar kinds of causal interactions between entities. So, nothing ontologically new, just, at most, new-ish alternative explanatory tools.

(This connects, I think, to the Deacon vs …

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh I’m more unsure than you about the new examples, Dimitri, and I’m still confused by the first one at the moment. It feels natural(ish?) to think of a real world group of objects and a process establishing connectivity between them and say something like ‘they became fully connected because the number of links exceeded ln(N), and that that feels not just like a description but like an explanation as something bound to happen. 1/n

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh in that way it feels constraint like? But what is it? I was thinking about logical constraints in the chapter on context independent constraints and that had me confused too. If one is thinking in terms of possibility spaces and what narrows them down (‘constrains’ them) then both logical constraints and the ln(N) threshold (whatever it is) feel as real as the notion of a possibility space itself (but what is the latter?)

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh 3/n but I’m also confused by the phase transition threshold in other ways: how is it like or unlike saying ‘if I have 2 objects and add one I now have >2’ because the transition threshold is neither strict (network doesn’t have to be conn.) or exact (it wouldn’t be wrong, in some sense, to say the network was connected because it had 1.5 ln(N) links…), and am I confusing a description with the constraint itself?….am lost in the weeds

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @dsmith @awaisaftab @uh 4/n and very last thought: it’s a very long time ago that I read the Kauffmann book, but I remember the point of it as being that evolution alone is insufficient to explain life and life forms as we see them, and that further constraints on generating structure are required to render it as anything other than wildly improbable - cue emergence and complexity. So he presumably thought example shows meaningful constraints in action?

@dcm@social.sunet.se @dcm@bookwyrm.social @NicoleCRust @dsmith @uh

I’m confused by the terminology too, but I’m thinking more and more that one’s opinion on both the notion and on the examples is going to be determined by how one thinks about possibilities or possibility spaces. If you start with those, then the notion of a constraint seems natural, and if you think of those possibilities in some sense as ‘real’, then constraints will be ‘real’ to that extent also.