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commented on Context Changes Everything by Alicia Juarrero

Alicia Juarrero: Context Changes Everything (2023, MIT Press, The MIT Press) 1 star

#JuarreroBook Chapter 6 Part 1 There's a lot in this chapter, and some of it I find hard to understand. So I'd like to split things up. We are now on context dependent constraints, the nature of which is to "take conditions away from independence"

The ch. outlines "three examples of the emergence of long-range correlations generated in virtue of context-dependent constraints. The first serves as a metaphor of phase transitions. The second illustrates inter-dependent dynamics among oscillators. The third is the textbook case of self- organizing, nonlinear, and far from equilibrium processes in the natural world. All three show how context-dependent constraints, operating against a backdrop established by context-independent constraints, weave global forms of order".

The examples are: 1. the phase transition of a random graph with sufficiently many links that it moves to connectedness

  1. synchronising pendulum clocks on a shelf

  2. convection patterns such as Bernard cells

What do people make of these examples? do they involve "transitions to a new possibility space" (pg. 70)? Do the constraints seem 'real' (metaphysically)? Is 'constraint satisfaction' as seen in these examples "an important form of "causality" that has been systematically ignored by modern science and philosophy" (pg. 72) ?

replied to uh's status

@uh @UlrikeHahn@fediscience.org @dcm@social.sunet.se

Indeed this is a much longer chapter! I stopped at p. 73 for now.

I share your concern about the ontology here: Juarrero talks constantly about constraints 'doing' things, and even being a form of causality (though she doesn't say how). But her examples suggest that what she calls constraints are just ways of describing patterns that appear when certain entities interact with each other in specific organised ways. This impression is reinforced by the apparently circular treatment of context-dependent constraints on p.70: they are characterised by appeal to constrained interactions...

But then, rather than being something ontologically additional that does things, constraints are just ways of talking about features of such patterns, which are in their turn constituted by the familiar kinds of causal interactions between entities. So, nothing ontologically new, just, at most, new-ish alternative explanatory tools.

(This connects, I think, to the Deacon vs …

@dcm@social.sunet.se @NicoleCRust @dcm@bookwyrm.social @awaisaftab @uh thanks for the paper! I had a quick read through and it is helpful, but I wanted to draw attention to something that already struck me when I went back and read van Gelder, which is that dynamical systems and complex systems are not the same thing, though related, and some of the aspects of J’s book that I’m most interested in like the mereological (part/whole) issues aren’t really part of the discussion of DS (in cogsci)

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @UlrikeHahn @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh

Full disclosure: I'm not reading Juarrero’s book. But I'm really enjoying your discussions.

I have a simple view of DST as an idea that literally models how nature moves forward. The motion aspect is important to me because in my field we want to understand development — cognitive, social/emotional, behavioural. DST helps me make sense of development and how internal and external circumstances both contribute to and constrain experience...

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @UlrikeHahn @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh

In most vertebrate species, the visual sensory system eventually turns the tables to dominate the auditory system. I believe that occurs in birds in the first few days of life with little individual difference. In humans, generally speaking, visual dominance takes a few years — with high context-specificity and considerable individual difference.

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @UlrikeHahn @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh

Due credit to Gottlieb et al.(2006) who make mention of a "general lack of appreciation of the role of functional constraints or limitations in the realization of early patterns of perceptual organization."

Gottlieb et al. (2006). The Significance of Biology for Human Developmnt: A Developmental Psychobiological Systems View. In Lerner & Damon (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Theoretical models of human development (pp. 210–257). Wiley.

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh I’m more unsure than you about the new examples, Dimitri, and I’m still confused by the first one at the moment. It feels natural(ish?) to think of a real world group of objects and a process establishing connectivity between them and say something like ‘they became fully connected because the number of links exceeded ln(N), and that that feels not just like a description but like an explanation as something bound to happen. 1/n

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh in that way it feels constraint like? But what is it? I was thinking about logical constraints in the chapter on context independent constraints and that had me confused too. If one is thinking in terms of possibility spaces and what narrows them down (‘constrains’ them) then both logical constraints and the ln(N) threshold (whatever it is) feel as real as the notion of a possibility space itself (but what is the latter?)

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh 3/n but I’m also confused by the phase transition threshold in other ways: how is it like or unlike saying ‘if I have 2 objects and add one I now have >2’ because the transition threshold is neither strict (network doesn’t have to be conn.) or exact (it wouldn’t be wrong, in some sense, to say the network was connected because it had 1.5 ln(N) links…), and am I confusing a description with the constraint itself?….am lost in the weeds

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @dsmith @awaisaftab @uh 4/n and very last thought: it’s a very long time ago that I read the Kauffmann book, but I remember the point of it as being that evolution alone is insufficient to explain life and life forms as we see them, and that further constraints on generating structure are required to render it as anything other than wildly improbable - cue emergence and complexity. So he presumably thought example shows meaningful constraints in action?

@dcm@bookwyrm.social @UlrikeHahn @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh

I like the term “constraint satisfaction” as it captures how conditions/experience can move an individual toward a regulated state (not unlike the synchronizing clocks).

cf: Blair describes causal role of SES, cortisone, etc., in emotional reactivity, school readiness.

Blair, C. (2002). School readiness: Integrating cognition and emotion in a neurobio conceptualization of children's functioning at school entry. The Amer Psych, 57, 111-127.

@UlrikeHahn @dcm@bookwyrm.social @NicoleCRust @dcm@social.sunet.se @awaisaftab @uh

I think I understand this difficulty. Not easy to describe a constraint... What caused your window to blow in, a specific wind or the entire storm? Any attempt to explain needs to account the big-picture storm, but then the explanation smacks of description.

Solution?.. I think the value of group discussion is that each of you brings diverse experience that can help all to "pan out" via concrete examples.

The Blair article is brilliant, btw.